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Key Points
·  This article proposes a new methodology for 
planning and evaluating public-policy advocacy. 
The methodology is designed around a series 
of stages, each with a different set of strate-
gic planning and assessment requirements.
· The article suggests that both planning and 
evaluative approaches that fail to take account 
of the necessary stages required to develop 
and then implement an advocacy strategy will 
likely assign the wrong indicators of success.   
· This analysis is based on direct experience 
working with both policy processes and a wide 
range of foundations and nonprofits that have 
invested in public-policy advocacy, including the 
Rockefeller, Ford, David and Lucille Packard, 
and William and Flora Hewlett foundations.
Introduction  
The rise of  outcome-oriented philanthropy has 
absorbed significant oxygen in the nonprofit 
sector over the last decade, and many of  its 
concepts and techniques are continuing to gain 
steam in philanthropic circles, helping leaders and 
institutions to think critically about how best to 
achieve results and measure impact (Brest, 2012).  
Yet one challenge to this movement has been the 
question of  how most effectively to plan, support, 
and evaluate public-policy advocacy. While phil-
anthropic investments in public-policy advocacy 
remain a core part of  many foundation strategies, 
planning and evaluation tools have not evolved 
to meet the challenge. In our view, the sector 
remains caught between two incomplete points of  
view. Some have said that public policy advocacy 
simply can’t be planned or measured with any 
rigor. Others believe public-policy planning and 
evaluation can adapt quantifiable measures to the 
public-policy context. 
In our opinion, while these approaches are use-
ful contributions on which we draw later in this 
article, neither of  them will work alone. We’ve 
worked directly with and for policymakers and 
consulted for advocates and nonprofits seeking 
policy change. From this experience, we suggest a 
new model, which we call “climbing the moun-
tain.” This approach segments the relevant stages 
of  public-policy advocacy and urges a mixture 
of  targeted quantitative and qualitative insights. 
By dividing public-policy advocacy efforts into 
discrete phases, this approach can help funders 
and advocates gain greater clarity about the incre-
mental measures of  success, adopt more realistic 
plans for impact, and know when and how to 
hold themselves accountable for public-policy 
outcomes.  
Debunking the Myths
If  the planning and assessment of  public-policy 
advocacy efforts are to improve, persistent myths 
about their nature and scope must be dispelled. 
These misconceptions often contain a kernel of  
truth applicable to some policy fights, but are 
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1211
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too easily (and frequently) misapplied. The result 
is that many funders and advocates treat every 
policy effort in the same terms, rather than adapt-
ing their tactics and techniques to each unique 
situation. 
The first is the “myth of  the movement.” This 
describes the idea that all public-policy reform 
movements proceed in essentially the same way. 
The two major camps are those who focus on 
the grassroots and those who believe that policy 
change emanates largely from insider maneuver-
ing. 
The truth is that both points of  view can be 
accurate depending on the issue, and there are 
numerous recent examples of  either approach 
carrying the day. Take Feed the Future, the federal 
government’s $3.5 billion program to alleviate 
global hunger (U.S. Agency for International 
Development, n.d.). The effort was aided by the 
Chicago Initiative on Global Agricultural Devel-
opment, convened by the Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs, and funded by the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation. Designed to reinvigorate the 
U.S. commitment to global agricultural develop-
ment as a solution to hunger, the Chicago Council 
process tapped an array of  thought leaders in 
foreign policy and development (Chicago Council 
on Global Affairs, n.d.b).
The initiative was well timed. Coinciding with 
the presidential transition and early months of  
the Obama’s administration, the effort provided a 
clear policy blueprint for incoming policymakers 
and featured high-level access from project leads 
(Independent Leaders Group, 2009). The initiative 
kicked off in September 2008 and by the follow-
ing July, President Obama stood shoulder-to-
shoulder with his counterparts at the G8 Summit 
in L’Aquila, Italy, to mutually commit to reducing 
global hunger (Baker & Dugger, 2009) – no broad 
movement, no armies of  activists, but billions of  
dollars aimed at reducing hunger through a clear, 
directed political and policy strategy. 
Recent years saw just the opposite strategy suc-
ceed to defeat two pieces of  legislation regard-
ing distribution of  content over the Internet. 
Championed by the film and music industries, the 
Protect IP Act (PIPA) in the Senate and its House 
companion, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), 
were proposed to address the problem of  foreign 
websites illegally distributing copyrighted content. 
Yet many in the Internet sector – from major 
companies such as Google down to individual 
app developers – opposed the bills as overbroad 
measures that would essentially censor Internet 
content and threaten innovation (Abrams, 2012a). 
While these players joined with open-Internet 
advocates in pursuing an aggressive strategy in 
Washington, the decisive moment was a massive 
uprising of  Internet users. Mobilized by com-
panies and nonprofit advocacy groups, millions 
of  users participated in a range of  traditional 
grassroots actions – with an Internet twist. On 
Nov. 16, 2011, when SOPA was scheduled for 
hearings in the House, the microblogging service 
Tumblr deployed an application that allowed In-
ternet denizens to call their member of  Congress 
with the click of  a button. Thanks to the ease of  
engagement, nearly 90,000 people did just that 
(Reisinger, 2011). A few months later, on Jan. 18, 
more than 100,000 websites including such giants 
as Wikipedia “blacked out” to protest the bills. 
The action prompted more than 4 million emails 
to Congress (Fight for the Future, n.d.). After 
the blackout, the two bills were effectively dead 
(Abrams, 2012b). 
While insider action was critical in driving criti-
cism of  the bills and spurring public engagement, 
We suggest a new model, 
which we call “climbing the 
mountain.” This approach 
segments the relevant stages 
of  public-policy advocacy and 
urges a mixture of  targeted 
quantitative and qualitative 
insights.
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it was the scope and size of  popular action that 
ultimately defeated two pieces of  legislation that 
began their lives with significant congressional 
support. 
In planning and assessing advocacy efforts, 
funders and advocates must recognize that a vari-
ety of  approaches can work, and they should let 
circumstances – not prior beliefs – dictate. 
The Myth of Duration
The second myth, the “myth of  duration,” is that 
all policy efforts require the same investment of  
time. This myth is false on its face, but a lack of  
clarity about the scope of  a given policy effort has 
bedeviled many efforts. 
Sometimes policy impact happens quickly. The 
Chicago Council’s Initiative on Global Agricultur-
al Development took less than a year to see signifi-
cant success, although it was built on decades of  
previous work in the field. The SOPA/PIPA fight 
was similarly short. Defending the gains made by 
Feed the Future or holding the line on Internet 
intellectual property policy may require lasting 
investment, but the overall term of  each effort 
was relatively brief.
Other fights are much longer. The Family and 
Medical Leave Act of  1993, a cornerstone of  
U.S. leave policy, took well over a decade to pass. 
Democratic Rep. Howard Berman, who had 
championed a leave law for mothers when he 
served in the California State Assembly, got the 
ball rolling on a federal law shortly after winning 
a seat in the U.S. House. Yet the concept would 
take many twists and turns before it became a 
central issue for a range of  progressive women’s 
groups in the late 1980s and, later, a cause célèbre 
for Democrats before evolving into a signature 
campaign issue for then-Gov. Bill Clinton during 
the 1992 presidential campaign (Elving, 1995).
The Myth of Movement
Finally, some public-policy efforts are episodic, 
with rapid progress followed by long periods of  
stagnation. The right to serve in the armed forces 
irrespective of  one’s sexual orientation had been 
a significant campaign issue for Clinton but, as 
president, he was forced to compromise on the 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, which was enacted 
through executive action due to bipartisan opposi-
tion to removing the prohibition against service 
by gays and lesbians in the U.S. military (Shanker 
& Healy, 2012). It was not until 2010 that Obama 
was able to work with Congress to finally repeal 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” (Stolberg, 2010).
A common mistake is to ascribe the wrong time 
horizon to different public-policy efforts. Suc-
cessful planning and assessment require taking a 
realistic view of  the issue, the prevailing political 
landscape, and the relative difficulty of  properly 
aligning the various forces in play. Treating a 
10-year effort like a short-term campaign won’t 
work. Just as unwise would be wasting an imme-
diate opportunity by building long-term infra-
structure.
The Myth of Means
The final myth is that the nonprofit sector is al-
ways outgunned. This is the “myth of  means”; at 
worst it results in despair, and at best a tolerance 
for inflexible and ineffective action. This myth 
derives from the truism that corporate and partial 
interests vastly outpace the nonprofit and philan-
thropic sector in the scale of  their investment in 
political processes at the local, state, and national 
levels. In 2013, total lobbying expenditures – while 
at a five-year low – reached $3.2 billion (Auble, 
2014). These advantages are real, and a steep 
financial advantage is abetted by significant tax 
code restrictions that constrain the ability of  the 
nonprofit sector to play on the same footing as so-
In planning and assessing 
advocacy efforts, funders and 
advocates must recognize 
that a variety of  approaches 
can work, and they should 
let circumstances – not prior 
beliefs – dictate. 
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called “special interests” (Schadler, 2012, p. 6).
Yet money is not destiny in public policy. The 
financial industry spent more than $386 million in 
lobbying in 2009 and 2010, when the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act was drafted, debated, and passed (Center for 
Responsive Politics, n.d.a). The finance, insurance, 
and real estate industries also contributed almost 
$64 million to federal candidates through political 
action committees during the 2010 electoral cycle, 
with spending nearly evenly divided between the 
parties (Center for Responsive Politics, n.d.b.). 
The health care industry spent $527 million in 
lobbying for 2009 alone during the debate over 
health care reform (Center for Responsive Politics, 
n.d.c). At one point in 2009, health care providers, 
insurers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers were 
spending more than $1 million per day (Eggen & 
Kindy, 2009).
In reform of  neither Wall Street nor health care 
did this astronomical investment carry the day. 
While industry won battles along the way and 
succeeded at watering down some aspects of  the 
laws, an alliance of  policymakers, public-interest 
advocates, and private stakeholders ultimately 
prevailed, passing historic pieces of  legislation 
– Dodd-Frank and the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act – that imposed wide-scale, 
meaningful reforms on two major industries. 
Money matters, but it is not decisive.
Once advocates and funders free themselves 
of  the myths of  the movement, duration, and 
means, they are prepared to take a clear-eyed view 
of  how public-policy reform can be achieved and 
how progress should be assessed along the way. 
They are ready to climb the mountain.
How to Climb the Mountain
Despite the wide variation in efforts at public-
policy reform, what holds them together are a set 
of  stages common to nearly every public-policy 
advocacy process. Identifying these stages within 
a given effort can make planning and evaluating 
public-policy advocacy much more rational, if  not 
considerably easier. Martha Campbell and Julia 
Coffman identify five major stages: “Choose the 
public policy goal,” “understand the challenge,” 
“identify which audiences can move the issue,” 
“determine how far audiences must move,” and 
“establish what it will take to move the audiences 
forward” (2009, pp. 124-126). These are useful, but 
they are most effective as guideposts to inform 
philanthropic strategy development, largely en-
capsulating a public-policy “theory of  change.”
We have come to conceptualize public-policy 
advocacy as climbing a mountain. Mountains 
can differ by height, by climate, and by grade of  
climb. In a given expedition, a climber can face 
a mixture of  well-worn paths and treacherous, 
vertical ascents. Efforts to engage in successful 
public-policy advocacy also vary in their degree 
of  difficulty and duration. Even within the same 
effort, there are moments of  impasse and frustra-
tion, followed by those of  easy triumph. An ideal 
planning and evaluative framework addresses 
each of  these stages on its own merits, rather than 
as a continuous whole.
The uniquely dynamic nature of  public policy is 
well recognized among commentators. As Camp-
bell and Coffman note, “because the policy pro-
cess is complex and dynamic, foundations must 
prepare for the likelihood that their grantmaking 
strategies will change over time. For instance, 
foundations may need to adapt them in response 
to shifting political circumstances or opportuni-
ties” (2009, p. 129). Similarly, Steven Teles and 
Mark Schmitt put the question of  judgment and 
adaptability at their heart of  their conception of  
public-policy advocacy. They call advocacy evalua-
tion “a form of  trained judgment,” explaining that 
“evaluators must recognize the complex, foggy 
Despite the wide variation in 
efforts at public-policy reform, 
what holds them together are a 
set of  stages common to nearly 
every public-policy advocacy 
process.
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chains of  causality in politics” (Teles & Schmitt, 
2011, p. 39).
Due to these considerations, we resist efforts to 
too rigidly assess, implement, and measure public-
policy processes. The temptation to develop 
quantitative systems may be great, but they are 
more likely to confuse judgment than to clarify 
decisions. For example, Ivan Barkhorn, Nathan 
Huttner, and Jason Blau have recently proposed 
a way to “score” nine key conditions for effective 
policy interventions. The conditions are sensible, 
ranging from ensuring a clear opportunity to 
developing a feasible solution to building a strong 
advocacy coalition and engaged public. For each 
condition, they suggest assigning a score between 
1 and 5 (where things are before commence-
ment and expected outcomes). These scores are 
then filtered through a mathematical formula to 
yield key indicators that range from the chances 
  PLANNING  EVALUATION 
ATTAINING THE SUMMIT   What is our ultimate goal? 
 Are we clear on the venue 
and time frame? 
 Did we achieve what we set 
out to do? 
 Are there policy steps left to 
be taken? 
REACHING BASECAMP   What will move decision‐
makers? 
 Are there tactical efforts 
necessary to consolidate 
success or inoculate 
ourselves? 
 Are we gaining tangible 
milestones? 
 Are the final steps in sight? 
 Is the issue firmly cemented 
on the agenda? 
STAGING THE CLIMB   Have we developed a 
strong, tactically detailed 
strategic plan? 
 Do we know the “who, 
what, when, where, and 
why” of the campaign 
effort? 
 Was our theory of change 
correct? 
 Do we have clear indicators 
that we are shifting 
attitudes of key audiences? 
PREPARING FOR THE CLIMB   Do we have a good sense of 
the capabilities and 
capacities needed to 
succeed? 
 Are these capacities in 
place, or do they require 
development? 
 Is there a plan and 
organizational hub or 
network to do so? 
 Are advocates building a 
credible presence in the 
field? 
 If this locus of work is new, 
are the background 
organizational and human 
capital elements being put 
into place? 
SURVEYING THE MOUNTAIN   Does this issue demand a 
public policy intervention? 
 Does a short‐, medium‐, or 
long‐term opportunity 
appear feasible? 
 Are we ready to devote 
significant resources to an 
uncertain endeavor? 
 Have we adequately 
planned an approach and 
considered multiple 
scenarios? 
 Will this align with our 
other strategies and 
programs long enough to 
stay the course? 
 
FIGURE 1 A Synopsis of the "Climbing the Mountain" Methodology as It Relates to Planning and Evaluation
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of  success to the hoped-for return. The authors 
acknowledge that this approach is “a decision-
making aid, not scientific truth” (Barkhorn, et al., 
2013, p. 61). Despite this caveat, such a methodol-
ogy converts numbers into a proxy for judgment, 
obscuring the sometimes very uncertain bets that 
philanthropy and advocates place when they take 
on public-policy advocacy.
The existing literature is largely consonant. 
Public-policy advocacy is essentially uncertain, 
often involving significant resources allocated 
for outcomes that may take years to come to 
fruition. Planning and evaluation rubrics that ask 
too much of  this hazy landscape will fail. To split 
the difference between illusory over-specification 
and a sense of  futility, we divide most efforts to 
impact public policy into five distinct stages. Each 
of  these stages represents a part of  the climb up 
the mountain of  policy: surveying the mountain, 
preparing for the climb, staging the climb, reach-
ing base camp, and attaining the summit. (See 
Figure 1.)
Stage 1: Surveying the Mountain
The first stage of  public-policy advocacy takes 
place before the first dollar is ever invested. This 
phase – “surveying the mountain” – marks the ini-
tial exploration of  opportunity. For philanthropy 
especially, this is a time to assess several critical 
factors: the opportunity for impact, the existing 
capacities within the field, and the relative cost of  
engagement. Activity in this stage is confined to 
planning, exploration, and assessment of  oppor-
tunities.
The essential task in “surveying the mountain” in-
volves literal surveying – what we sometimes refer 
to as “landscaping” an issue. This requires com-
missioning original research – both qualitative and 
quantitative – about the needs within the field and 
the potential scope of  impact, and a sober analysis 
of  the policy opportunity. Our methodology in 
this stage has often focused heavily on confidential 
stakeholder interviews that canvass interested 
parties, potential allies, possible competitors, 
and target audiences. This process is designed to 
elevate opportunities and uncover barriers.
This is also a time to have a clear grasp of  the 
legal terrain. The laws governing nonprofits can 
be restrictive. This does not mean advocacy is not 
possible, only that it must be undertaken with 
care and after appropriate due diligence.
Expending significant effort in anticipating and 
understanding the target field or issue for public-
policy advocacy pays dividends once engagement 
begins. It provides for more targeted planning, 
allows for preemptive accommodation of  pos-
sible obstacles, and ensures that investment and 
activity originate from clear thinking about the 
task ahead. At this stage, planning aids – such 
as Campbell and Coffman’s five stages to design 
public-policy strategies or an inventory along the 
lines of  Barkhorn, Huttner, and Blau’s nine condi-
tions for effective campaigns – are most useful.
Stage 2: Preparing for the Climb
Once the planning is done, the work begins. In 
many cases, advocates enter the fray with little 
more than the desks at which they sit, specific 
issue knowledge they need to begin making their 
case, and a strong desire to effect change. They 
may have some relationships with other players, 
Expending significant effort in 
anticipating and understanding 
the target field or issue for 
public-policy advocacy pays 
dividends once engagement 
begins. It provides for more 
targeted planning, allows for 
preemptive accommodation of  
possible obstacles, and ensures 
that investment and activity 
originate from clear thinking 
about the task ahead.
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but their strategy is likely just coming into being. 
They are probably without the coalition or net-
work that will ultimately carry the day and may 
lack many of  the necessary capacities to exert a 
direct influence on policymaking.
“Preparing for the climb” describes the first 
“active” stage in a public-policy advocacy effort. 
For nascent efforts that aim at major legislative 
change, this stage may be marked by actions as 
basic as forming a core organization and hiring 
a staff. Even when mature organizations take on 
new issues, their early work is often consumed by 
adding staff and forging relationships with puta-
tive allies and others engaged in the issue. This pe-
riod often includes the hard work of  demonstrat-
ing some “ownership” of  the topic by advertising 
engagement to a broader set of  individuals and 
organizations. It will likely also involve building 
relationships with policymakers and other targets.
Other efforts take aim at more modest, targeted 
action. For example, advocates may seek direct 
intervention by policymakers such as a letter from 
a member of  Congress. For these initiatives, get-
ting started may mean building key relationships 
with a narrower set of  influencers, or acquiring 
internal or external capacity to provide direct ac-
cess to ongoing policy processes.
All of  these activities are focused on helping ad-
vocates to become “mountain climbers” –credible 
participants with a platform to engage the policy-
making process. From a planning perspective, the 
key questions for this stage should be focused on 
capacity. Does an organization or coalition have 
the people and resources it needs to invest in suc-
cess? Strategic plans to “get in the game” should 
address basic infrastructural questions about how 
to design a new entity or bolster an existing one. 
Preparing for this stage also requires a sophisti-
cated political outlook about the precise pathways 
by which policy change will happen – what in phi-
lanthropy is referred to as a “theory of  change.” 
This will help ensure that advocates plot out 
capacities that match what it will take to succeed. 
An issue that will happen in a legislative arena will 
require a lobbying capacity, for example, where an 
administrative rule change may not.
Evaluation of  the first stage should take a 
similarly circumscribed approach. Many of  the 
metrics advocates routinely file in reports reflect 
“preparing for the climb”: how many meetings 
with policymakers, the number of  media hits, 
the size of  the coalition. Yet there are neglected 
indicators of  success at this stage, many of  them 
qualitative. To what extent have needed capacities 
been developed? Do key participants in the effort 
display trust and a good working relationship? 
Does the strategic orientation accurately reflect a 
credible pathway to success? These questions are 
equally important, and the answers can provide 
a valuable assessment of  the early health of  a 
public-policy effort.
Commentators often regard these capacities as 
essential elements of  successful campaigns –and 
they are. Barkhorn, Huttner, and Blau identify 
“strong campaign leader(s)” and an “influential 
support coalition” among their nine conditions for 
public-policy campaigns to succeed (2013, p. 61). 
Teles and Schmitt add that the “key” to public-pol-
icy advocacy “is not strategy so much as strategic 
capacity: the ability to read the shifting environ-
ment of  politics for subtle signals of  change, to 
understand the opposition, and to adapt deftly” 
(2011, p. 41).
Where we diverge is in insisting that such capaci-
ties may have to be built, rather than made. On an 
All of  these activities are 
focused on helping advocates to 
become “mountain climbers” 
– credible participants with 
a platform to engage the 
policymaking process. From a 
planning perspective, the key 
questions for this stage should 
be focused on capacity. 
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issue of  merit and urgency, the lack of  existing ca-
pacity should not itself  rule out an investment or 
effort. The first stage, “preparing for the climb,” 
recognizes the enormous effort required to simply 
be a presence on a given public-policy issue. It’s 
often in later stages – when organizations have 
already demonstrated success – that investment 
becomes attractive and results feel tangible. Yet in-
telligent early planning, investment, and patience 
are just as vital to ensuring that such later achieve-
ments have a chance to come to fruition.
Stage 3: Staging the Climb
Issues tend to move through our public and politi-
cal culture in waves. A cause or problem may wait 
in silence and obscurity for years before it sud-
denly seems to become a dominant topic in the 
news, on op-ed pages, and among policymakers. 
Yet this transition is rarely as abrupt as it appears. 
Even when an issue truly does rocket onto the 
scene, its seemingly spontaneous appearance is 
likely not wholly an accident of  fate, although 
serendipity may play a role. The recent debate on 
immigration is a good example. Advocates have 
been diligently working for decades. When de-
mographic shifts in the electorate during the 2012 
election forced policymakers from both parties 
to take up the issue (Brown, Sherman, & Raju, 
2012), a wide and robust advocacy community 
had long been shaping the contours of  the debate 
(Lamarche, 2013).
This process of  elevating an issue into the broader 
consciousness is “staging the climb,” the third 
stage in climbing the mountain. This refers to the 
point at which an issue begins to enjoy significant 
traction within the circle of  influencers that a 
sound theory of  change identifies as critical levers. 
Beginning the climb requires focusing on activi-
ties that are clearly aligned with outcomes, but 
are broad enough to represent the major strategic 
pillars of  short- or long-term engagement. At 
this stage, planning and evaluation move beyond 
infrastructure concerns and begin addressing the 
signs and symptoms that activities are beginning 
to move the needle on an issue.
In planning or investing in a public-policy advo-
cacy effort, “staging the climb” is the stage at 
which the effort launches a discrete campaign 
or series of  activities to drive toward a concrete 
outcome. For example, a foundation may decide 
that national advocacy is a necessary component 
of  its overall strategy to reduce the rate of  child-
hood obesity. This is the stage to determine the 
specific advocacy elements that figure into that 
strategy. At this point, all of  the “preparing for the 
climb” requirements have been met. A credible 
advocate or advocates with appropriate capabili-
ties should be in place. What remains is to plan 
and implement a concrete effort. In the case of  
childhood obesity, perhaps this is a multipronged 
approach focused on K-12 adoption of  a healthy-
eating curriculum, a national law on nutritional 
standards in food, and regulatory reform of  foods 
served in schools. Each of  these activities requires 
a detailed strategic plan that answers the “who, 
what, where, when, and why.”
The “why” is especially important. It is at the 
“staging the climb” phase that a foundation or 
nonprofit must screen out activities that are not 
likely to have a tangible impact on outcomes. Suc-
cess is never guaranteed in public-policy advocacy, 
but this initial strategic roadmap should illustrate 
a credible hypothesis. In the anti-obesity case, if  it 
is unlikely that any schools will adopt a healthy-
This process of  elevating 
an issue into the broader 
consciousness is “staging 
the climb,” the third stage in 
climbing the mountain. This 
refers to the point at which an 
issue begins to enjoy significant 
traction within the circle of  
influencers that a sound theory 
of  change identifies as critical 
levers. 
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eating curriculum, then this activity stream is 
likely to drain resources without producing mean-
ingful results and should be eliminated.
Evaluation should track the implementation of  
these strategies, but not focus too heavily on final 
outcomes. In the fictional anti-obesity example, 
the number of  school districts that adopt the 
curriculum should take a privileged place. Other 
metrics will matter as well. If  a local media 
strategy figured within the strategic plan for this 
element, then the number of  media hits in target 
school districts is significant. Similarly, evaluation 
may take account of  supporting campaign ele-
ments, such as long-term alliances forged with key 
constituencies.
While the intended outcome is adoption of  a K-12 
anti-obesity curriculum at the school-district level, 
the relative success in achieving this result cannot 
trump all other considerations. This is not to 
excuse half-measures, but to acknowledge a brute 
reality about public-policy advocacy: that it cannot 
be planned with the benefit of  rigorous predictive 
tools. Businesses can assess market opportuni-
ties with a far higher level of  confidence than a 
foundation or nonprofit can prognosticate how 
political calculations will be made in a changing 
public ecosystem.
This does not mean that public-policy advocacy 
planning and evaluation should take a fatalistic ap-
proach to objectives, only that the need for learn-
ing and adaptation is acute. Every public-policy 
and advocacy effort is a hypothesis that is tested in 
real time. The quantitative and qualitative metrics 
that extend deeper than the final objective can 
elicit important information about that hypoth-
esis. In our anti-obesity example, perhaps the deci-
sive issue for potential adopter school districts that 
ultimately did not take on the new curriculum 
was a countervailing message about the “nanny 
state” that warned against schools policing child 
behavior. This might suggest a more parent-ori-
ented approach in the future. Or perhaps school 
districts required affirmation from teacher and 
administrator associations, implying the need for 
a better effort to recruit these constituencies from 
the beginning.
Testing various hypotheses constitutes the bulk of  
any effort that has reached the third stage of  the 
mountain. This stage is often the most arduous 
part of  the climb, because it may reveal flawed 
assumptions that could not have been anticipated. 
For this reason, success at this stage should be 
measured both by the progress of  the climb to-
ward identified objectives and by the ability of  an 
organization, initiative, or campaign to be adapt-
able and open to change.
Stage 4: Reaching Base Camp
Before the passage of  a bill or change to a rule, 
public-policy advocacy campaigns may reach sig-
nificant milestones. In a complex legislative fight, 
just getting a vote may represent progress. Leave 
laws were introduced, reintroduced, and voted 
on several times before Clinton signed the family 
leave act into law. The very peak of  the mountain 
may be elusive at the same time that an effort is 
inching upward. Public-policy advocacy efforts 
that reach this stage are taking genuine strides 
toward final outcomes, and these intermediate 
outcomes may be achievements in themselves. 
For all the difficulty in attaining them, however, 
they are still short of  ultimate success.
The fourth stage in the mountain – “reaching base 
camp” – honors these intermediate outcomes and 
represents the period when an effort is poised for 
long-term success, but still has work to do. This is 
also the phase that is most vulnerable to the vicis-
situdes of  the public-policy process.
Before the passage of  a bill or 
change to a rule, public-policy 
advocacy campaigns may reach 
significant milestones. In a 
complex legislative fight, just 
getting a vote may represent 
progress.
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At this stage, the strategic plans that were imple-
mented in “staging the climb” should evolve into 
a highly granular set of  tactical moves. For ex-
ample, an early phase in a legislative strategy may 
have included lining up long-term champions. At 
this stage the focus should be on what levers to 
pull to prompt action from those champions. This 
stage should also take account of  marginal stra-
tegic amendments that will move an effort across 
the finish line, such as identifying constituencies 
essential to a coalition and determining what 
would assure their participation.
Evaluation at this stage should be focused on of-
ficial milestones in policymaking processes. In the 
legislative context, this could mean bills are being 
introduced, discussed, and voted on, irrespective 
of  success. In the case of  regulation, it could mean 
that draft rules are being circulated or rulemak-
ing processes are launching. Policymakers need 
not be acting at this stage, but the issue should be 
firmly on the radar.
Stage 5: Attaining the Summit
The final stage of  the mountain is best described 
as “attaining the summit.” This is the phase in 
which concrete outcomes matter most, but even 
at the peak of  the mountain there are meaning-
ful gradations. Perhaps the desired outcome is 
a simple regulatory change. Or maybe an effort 
is simply seeking to prevent a program from 
being eliminated. All of  these outcomes count. 
What matters at this stage is the extent to which 
policymaking results correspond to outcomes 
out in the world. That is, has the policymaking 
victory achieved desired outcomes for people and 
institutions?
While this is the final stage at the mountain, it 
should figure into the earliest discussions around 
a public-policy advocacy effort. The outcome 
sought also dictates the height of  the mountain 
or, literally, the scope of  the endeavor. An attempt 
to prevent a program from being cut may face a 
shorter time frame and employ a more targeted 
strategy than a campaign to pass a major piece of  
reform legislation. From a planning perspective, 
this means having a clear sense of  the potential 
endgame from the beginning. Too many public-
policy advocacy efforts are agnostic in their early 
stages about exactly what constitutes success. 
This is willful blindness. Substantive negotiation 
and compromise will be essential to the process, 
as will adaptation, but beginning without even a 
provisional aspiration handcuffs any meaningful 
planning.
This impacts evaluation as well. Public-policy 
advocacy efforts that refuse to state their ultimate 
goals or their intermediate objectives can never be 
meaningfully evaluated. The “climbing the moun-
tain” methodology makes clear that end results 
are not the only measure of  success in public-pol-
icy advocacy, but the opposite extreme – that they 
should not matter at all – is equally destructive to 
rigorous accountability.
Climb and Climb Again
One illusion implied by the analogy of  “climbing 
the mountain” is that the ascent is always linear. 
An initiative starts at the base of  the mountain, 
proceeds through each stage, and then reaches the 
top. This is a fiction, and obscures three critical 
truths about public-policy advocacy.
The first is that adaptation is an inherent feature 
of  effective advocacy efforts. Many long-term 
campaigns near the peak without reaching it. 
They lose a critical vote on a piece of  legislation, 
or win in one house of  Congress before losing in 
the other. In these cases, a campaign may have 
to move down a stage in the climb, revisiting its 
strategy and capabilities.
The final stage of  the mountain 
is best described as “attaining 
the summit.” This is the phase 
in which concrete outcomes 
matter most, but even at the 
peak of  the mountain there are 
meaningful gradations.
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The second is, to stretch the conceit further, the 
impact of  the weather. Very little in a public-
policy advocacy fight is under the control of  
advocates. A sudden change in circumstances can 
derail a campaign or, conversely, breathe new life 
into a lost cause. Health care reform is a recent 
example. Had President Obama not insisted on 
making reform a signal cause of  his first term, 
it is unlikely a bill would have passed (Brown & 
Thrush, 2013). Unquestionably, decades of  effec-
tive advocacy helped set the stage for his decision 
and the final victory, but to a large extent the issue 
was decided by the will of  a single person. A good 
public-policy advocacy campaign plans for the 
weather, ready to climb when clouds clear and 
ready to retreat when storms set in.
The third truth – to push the metaphor to its 
utmost limits – may be the size of  the mountain. 
Public-policy challenges are rarely straightfor-
ward. What makes public-policy investment so 
attractive is the ability to leverage enormous 
resources – material and in policy fiat – to solve 
sometimes systemic challenges. Some of  these 
social and economic issues introduce major 
obstacles into the policy process. Others are so 
deep that even a successful campaign may not 
reach them. Indeed, well-intentioned public poli-
cies have often been shown to introduce perverse 
effects or negative externalities. No amount of  
planning may ultimately be able to discern the 
size and shape of  the mountain, or the depth of  
the crevasses it hides.
Conclusion
These factors only underscore the uncertainty 
that afflicts public-policy advocacy, leaving it 
resistant to many of  the now well-established 
tools to aid foundations and nonprofits in plan-
ning and evaluation. The response to these unique 
difficulties should not be to give up and abandon 
rigor, but to employ a different set of  tools better 
adapted to the public-policy context. Successful 
public-policy advocacy is within reach. The key is 
to tailor efforts to the unique context of  the issue, 
develop appropriate and meaningful benchmarks, 
and plan effectively.
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